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Abstract5
With many real world decisions being made in conjunction with other decision makers, or single agent de-6
cisions having an influence on other members of the decision maker’s immediate entourage, there is strong7
interest in studying the relative weight assigned to different agents in such contexts. In the present paper, we8
focus on the case of one member of a two person household being asked to make choices affecting the travel9
time and salary of both members. We highlight the presence of significant heterogeneity across individuals10
not just in their underlying sensitivities, but also in the relative weight they assign to their partner, and show11
how this weight varies across attributes. This is in contrast to existing work which uses weights assigned12
to individual agents at the level of the overall utility rather than for individual attributes. We also show13
clear evidence of a risk of confounding between heterogeneity in marginal sensitivities and heterogeneity in14
the weights assigned to each member. We show how this can lead to misleading model results, and argue15
that this may also explain past results showing bargaining or weight parameters outside the usual [0, 1]16
range in more traditional joint decision making contexts. In terms of substantive results, we find that male17
respondents place more weight on their partner’s travel time, while female respondents place more weight18
on their partner’s salary.19
20
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1 Introduction23
Data on choice behaviour is routinely used to derive individuals’ preferences for goods and services.24
However, there is acknowledgment across fields that many real life decisions are made not by25
a single person in isolation, but in consultation with other actors. Similarly, a single person may26
make choices that affect other members of their household or peer group. The majority of such work27
has looked at decisions in a household context, and this will be the framework for the remainder28
of this paper.29
If choices are made jointly by a number of household members, then it is likely that they take30
part in a negotiation process in order to maximise some joint-utility function. Similarly, when an31
individual is making a decision that will affect more than just themselves, the expectation is that,32
at least to some degree, they will take into consideration the preferences held by other household33
members (or perceived to be held), which may be different from theirs. They are also likely to give34
differential weight to their own preferences and those of their partner across different attributes.35
In the context of joint decisions, the recognition of the differential influence of individual players36
has moved us away from the unitary household model or ‘common preference model’ which assumes37
that, irrespective of the members of a household, it will act as a single-decision-making unit, wherein38
a single preference function will represent all members of the group (see, for example, discussions39
in Adamowicz et al., 2005, Katz, 1997, Lampietti, 1999 and Vermeulen, 2002). This has led to a40
significant body of work looking at how members of a household may engage in a process of joint41
deliberation in order to maximise both their individual and joint utility functions (see, for example42
Adamowicz et al., 2005, Marcucci et al., 2011 and Munro, 2009 for a comprehensive review, as well43
as key developments in Aribarg et al., 2002, Arora and Allenby, 1999, Browning and Chiappori,44
1998, Dellaert et al., 1998, Dosman and Adamowicz, 2006 and Hensher et al., 2008). Within this45
literature, it is evident that there is not only disparity between household member’s preferences,46
but also between the choices made by individuals and the choices made by households collectively.47
While some analysts have explicitly modelled the bargaining process (Hensher et al., 2008), this48
requires a very specific approach to data collection, using an iterative process. In the majority of49
work however, only information on choices is observed, as the bargaining process is not captured50
explicitly in data collection (Dosman and Adamowicz, 2006). The key here is that choices are51
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observed for individual respondents in addition to the joint choices, and that estimation on a52
pooled dataset allows the calibration of weights attached to individual decision makers, which53
represent their influence in the joint choice. An important area of interest in that context has54
been the study of heterogeneity across respondents, both in terms of their sensitivities, as well as55
their weight in this bargaining process (see e.g. Beharry-Borg et al., 2009). Crucially, this model56
approach is suitable not just for the analysis of joint decisions, but also the analysis of data where57
one respondent makes choices affecting multiple agents. The work described in the present paper58
falls into this last category.59
In common with work for example by the above cited Beharry-Borg et al. (2009), the present60
paper makes the case that, just as in more traditional choice data (i.e. choices by a single agent af-61
fecting only themselves), there exist significant differences across people in the context of household62
level decisions. Our assertion is that not adequately representing such heterogeneity, both in the63
underlying sensitivities and the relative weight assigned to a person’s own sensitivities and those64
of their partner, may lead to misguided findings. Crucially, there is significant risk of confounding65
between heterogeneity in the marginal utility coefficients and the bargaining or weight parameters,66
where inappropriate specifications are likely to exacerbate problems. We also argue that there may67
be heterogeneity across attributes in the weights assigned to individual agents, thus highlighting the68
potential disadvantages of the common assumption in the literature that the relative importance69
of an agent is constant across attributes.70
We support these claims through an empirical analysis using stated choice data examining the71
intra-household preferences for commuting time and salary collected in the Stockholm region of72
Sweden. Specifically, in this survey, each member of a dyadic1 household was individually asked to73
trade between their own commuting time and salary and also their partner’s commuting time and74
salary. While the emphasis in this paper is on decisions at the household level, the methodological75
discussions clearly also have relevance in other joint decision-making contexts relying on the bar-76
gaining model. Similarly, even though in contrast to the recreational choice contexts of Dosman77
and Adamowicz (2006) and Beharry-Borg et al. (2009), our work looks at the choice to travel to78
work, the modelling framework is general and applies across contexts.79
Our results suggest the presence of significant levels of heterogeneity both in the underlying80
1 A household containing two individuals, living as partners.
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sensitivities of individual respondents as well as in the weights they assign to their partners. A81
failure to jointly account for both types of heterogeneity leads to inferior results and possibly82
misguided interpretations. Furthermore, either not accounting jointly for the heterogeneity in the83
utility and weight parameters, or making inappropriate distributional assumptions, or using utility84
rather than attribute level weight parameters, can play a strong role in producing results that85
indicate weight parameters outside the [0, 1] range. We argue that our theoretical claims and86
empirical results in part explain such results in previous work.87
The specific contribution of this paper is thus to highlight the interaction between the hetero-88
geneity assumptions for the utility parameters and bargaining or weight coefficients, and to make89
the case for attribute specific rather than utility level weights for the individual decision makers.90
Although existing work has looked at the issue of taste heterogeneity and has allowed either for91
deterministic (Dosman and Adamowicz, 2006) or random heterogeneity (Beharry-Borg et al., 2009)92
in the weight parameters, it has not adequately addressed the issues of confounding and the impact93
of distributional assumptions. Additionally, while attribute specific weight parameters are referred94
to by Beharry-Borg et al. (2009), their estimation still relies on utility level weight parameters,95
further increasing the novelty of our work.96
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the models97
that are applicable in this context, with a particular emphasis on the specification of bargaining98
or weight parameters. This is followed by our empirical application in Section 3, and a concluding99
discussion is presented in Section 4.100
2 Theory101
Independently of whether the choice relates to a joint decision or a single person making a decision102
for a household, the utility that household h obtains from choosing alternative j is represented as:103
Uhj = Vhj + εhj , (1)
where Vhj is the deterministic component of utility and εhj is the random component. Focussing104
on a two-person context, we recognise that the different members of a household potentially have105
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different marginal sensitivities (i.e. we have β1 for person 1 and β2 for person 2), carry different106
weight in a joint decision process or are given different weight by the person making decisions107
affecting both people. As such, we now have that:108
Vhj = λ1f (β1, x1j) + λ2f (β2, x2j) , (2)
where x1j and x2j relate to the vector x of explanatory variables for alternative j for the two109
household members. The functional form of the utility function is defined by f (β1, x1j), where the110
majority of applications rely on a linear in parameters specification. The two additional parameters111
λ1 and λ2 give the weights of the two household members (either in the joint decision making process112
or differences in the weight assigned by the single decision maker), where we have that λ1 +λ2 = 1113
for identification reasons. Usually, the assumption is also made that 0 ≤ λp ≤ 1, p = 1,2, a point114
we will return to below.115
Existing work has relied on generic λ parameters across attributes, thus assuming that the116
weight assigned to a given agent is constant across attributes. This is clearly a simplistic assumption117
which is derived in particular from the notion of influence of one person in a joint decision making118
process but which does not recognise that the influence of given agents may vary across attributes.119
This possibility was acknowledged by Beharry-Borg et al. (2009) but not used in their estimations.120
Again without making assumptions about functional form, Equation 2 would be replaced by:121
Vhj =
K∑
k=1
λ1,kfk (β1,k, x1j,k) + λ2,kfk (β2,k, x2j,k) , (3)
where the subscript k now refers to attribute k out of K.122
A model of the type shown in Equation 2 or Equation 3 needs to be estimated on pooled data123
containing individual choices as well as either joint choices or choices affecting both agents but made124
by one respondent. The joint estimation of both β1, β2 and λp is only possible when individual125
choices are observed for both agents, in addition to joint choices. When the choices affecting both126
agents are made by one respondent only, who also provides individual choices affecting only the127
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respondent himself or herself, then we can either estimate β1 and β2, or β and λp. With the128
relevance of the model specification to data on joint choices in mind, we make use of the latter in129
our application2.130
In a model estimated on data with joint choices, λ seeks to capture the influence that each131
decision maker has on forming the joint utility function, either overall or at the attribute level. In132
a model estimated on data containing household choices made by one decision maker, λ is likely to133
capture both the relative importance that this person attaches to the members of the household,134
as well as this respondent’s perception of the value that their partner would place on the attribute,135
relative to the decision maker’s perception, in the case where attribute specific λ parameters are136
used.137
A significant amount of research has gone into the specification of the λ parameters in such138
models. The assumption of λ1 = λ2 = 0.5 is generally rejected on theoretical as well as empirical139
grounds. With the weights being freely estimated rather than constrained to be equal, an important140
question then arises as to the range for these weights. Although it seems reasonable to think that141
joint taste intensities or household level sensitivities selected by one person, should be intermediate142
between individual taste intensities, i.e. λ falling within the [0, 1] range, this may not always be143
the case (cf. Adamowicz et al., 2005), and there are examples of estimates outside this range (see,144
for example Beharry-Borg et al., 2009).145
A number of interpretations for a λ estimate outside the [0, 1] interval have been put forward.146
For instance, Dellaert et al. (1998) describes a negative value for λ as the “systematic denial of147
the individual’s preference in the joint evaluation”, whilst Beharry-Borg et al. (2009) suggest that148
when an individual is a member of a group, their preferences may be even stronger than their149
individual responses would have been if they were not part of the group. This is known as the150
group polarization phenomenon (cf. Arora and Allenby, 1999; Myers and Lamm, 1976; Rao and151
Steckel, 1991; Steckel et al., 1991). Similarly, Bateman and Munro (2005) find couples making152
more risk adverse choices when facing tasks together compared to when the partners faced the153
same decision-making tasks individually.154
A key hypothesis put forward in the present paper is that λ parameters outside the [0, 1]155
2 It can be seen that a model with attribute specific λp parameters is equivalent to a model estimating β1 and β2,
a point we will return to later in the paper.
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interval (cf. Dosman and Adamowicz, 2006; Beharry-Borg et al., 2009) may be caused in part156
by inappropriate specifications and confounding. In particular, we argue that there is scope for157
heterogeneity in both the utility parameters β and the weight parameters λ, be it deterministic158
or random heterogeneity, in line with Dosman and Adamowicz (2006); Beharry-Borg et al. (2009).159
Additionally, we put forward the notion that the weight of individual decision makers varies across160
attributes, where this could be accommodated in attribute specific λ parameters. Not accounting161
fully for the heterogeneity across respondents in β and λ as well as the hetereogeneity across162
attributes in λ not only risks leading to inferior model performance but might cause confounding163
that could explain some of the previous findings of λ parameters outside the [0, 1] interval. The164
same clearly applies to using inappropriate distributions for λ which would impose a non-zero165
probability of values outside the [0, 1] interval rather than allowing them to be retrieved in the166
analysis. For that reason, we make the case that the bounds on λ should be estimated, rather than167
imposed, including through using unbounded distributions.168
3 Empirical application: a work place location study in Sweden169
This section presents the results from our case study of the role of heterogeneity in sensitivities and170
weights assigned to household members in the scenario where both members of a dyadic household171
individually provide choices in settings that would affect both members. We first discuss the data172
before turning our attention to model results, where we initially focus on model specification and173
results for structures without heterogeneity across respondents before turning to model specification174
and results for structures allowing for such heterogeneity.175
3.1 Data176
The data used for this application come from a survey conducted in the Stockholm region of177
Sweden in 2005. The specific interest of the survey was a study of the trade-offs between salary178
and commuting time. For more detailed information on the data the reader is directed to Swa¨rdh179
and Algers (2009).180
As with any stated choice survey, the reliability of the data depends on respondents’ limited181
ability to treat the attributes in isolation, i.e. there is a possibility that the sensitivity to salary182
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changes will be to some extent influenced by the perceived effect that increases in travel time will183
have on increased travel costs. These issues, while important, are beyond the scope of the present184
paper, although we recognise the advantages of an approach jointly using stated preference and185
revealed preference data, such as in Dosman and Adamowicz (2006)3. The suitability of our data186
for the type of model discussed in this paper, despite not being traditional joint decision making187
data, stems from the fact that each person provides choices both for scenarios affecting only them188
and scenarios affecting both them and their partner. In fact, the absence of a negotiating process in189
such data, which would ideally require approaches such as discussed for example by Hensher et al.190
(2008), arguably avoids some of the issues arising in the application of such models to traditional191
joint choice data.192
The study was conducted in two parts. First, each member of the household was asked to193
consider a choice between their current commute and one which would give them increased salaray194
in return for increased travel time. The survey thus looks at the willingness to accept (WTA)195
increased journey time in return for increased salary4. An example choice task for this first game196
is shown in Figure 1, where travel time is in minutes, and salary is in Swedish Kronor5.197  
 
Which alternative would you prefer if the company offered the following options in the choice of workplace 
location?  
     
 Alternative 1  Alternative 2  
 Today’s travel time  25 minutes longer travel time than today  
 Today’s salary  The salary is 1000 kronor more per month 
than today (after tax) 
 
     
                         Alternative 1                 Alternative 2  
     
 Indifferent  
   
 
Which alternative would you prefer if the company offered the following options in the choice of workplace 
location?  
     
 Alternative 1  Alternative 2  
 You Your partner  You Your partner  
 Today’s location 
(Travel time and 
salary as today) 
Today’s location 
(Travel time and 
salary as today) 
 25 minutes longer 
travel time than today 
10 minutes longer 
travel time than today 
 
    The salary is 1000 
kronor more per month 
than today (after tax) 
The salary is 500 
kronor more per 
month than today 
(after tax) 
 
     
                         Alternative 1                 Alternative 2  
     
 Indifferent  
   
 
Fig. 1: Example of a stated choice scenario for game 1
Once the respondent had completed a series of these choice tasks they were then asked to complete198
3 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for highlighting this.
4 The survey thus works with travel time per trip and salary per month. We acknowledge the different units of
these two components and the potential shortcomings of this from a microeonomic theory perspective. However,
from a behavioural perspective, salary is paid per month and travel time is experienced per journey, and this was the
approach taken in the study - see also Swa¨rdh and Algers (2009)
5 The 2005 exchange is approximately £0.07 per SEK1.
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the second part of the survey. In the second game, each respondent was asked in addition to199
consider the trade-off between increasing the length of time that it would take their partner to200
travel to work and an increase in their partner’s monthly salary. An example choice task for this201
second game is shown in Figure 2. Crucially, the adjustments presented in this second task were202
not necessarily identical in proportion for the respondent and their partner.203
 
 
Which alternative would you prefer if the company offered the following options in the choice of workplace 
location?  
     
 Alternative 1  Alternative 2  
 Today’s travel time  25 minutes longer travel time than today  
 Today’s salary  The salary is 1000 kronor more per month 
than today (after tax) 
 
     
                         Alternative 1                 Alternative 2  
     
 Indifferent  
   
 
Which alternative would you prefer if the company offered the following options in the choice of workplace 
location?  
     
 Alternative 1  Alternative 2  
 You Your partner  You Your partner  
 Today’s location 
(Travel time and 
salary as today) 
Today’s location 
(Travel time and 
salary as today) 
 25 minutes longer 
travel time than today 
10 minutes longer 
travel time than today 
 
    The salary is 1000 
kronor more per month 
than today (after tax) 
The salary is 500 
kronor more per 
month than today 
(after tax) 
 
     
                         Alternative 1                 Alternative 2  
     
 Indifferent  
   
 
Fig. 2: Example of a stated choice scenario for game 2
As can be seen from Figure 1 and Figure 2, each choice task contained two alternatives but the204
respondent was also given the opportunity to indicate indifference between the two options. For the205
purposes of the choice modelling analysis, this was coded as a third alternative. Each respondent206
was given four scenarios to complete in the first game, and an additional four or five tasks in the207
second game, depending on which version of the design was used. Within each household, the208
man and the woman by design usually received different versions of the survey. In total, responses209
were collected from 2,358 respondents, i.e. 1,179 couples. This provided us with a total of 20,041210
observations.211
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3.2 Models not allowing for heterogeneity212
3.2.1 Model specification213
A number of different models were estimated, each time pooling the data from the choice tasks214
concerning only the household member completing the survey with the data from the choice tasks215
concerning both members. All models were estimated in Biogeme (Bierlaire, 2003). To recognise216
the repeated choice nature of the data, the standard errors in all models were computed using the217
panel specification of the sandwich matrix (cf. Daly and Hess, 2011).218
For the first game, as shown in Figure 1, the observable component of the utility function for219
the three alternatives and individual n in choice scenario t is given by:220
Vnt1 = α1,1 + βTTTTnt1 + βL-SalL-Salnt1
Vnt2 = βTTTTnt2 + βL-SalL-Salnt2
Vnt3 = α1,3 (4)
where βTT and βL-Sal give the marginal utility coefficients for travel time (TT) and the logarithm of221
salary (L-Sal) - such a non-linear specification for salary produced superior results. Furthermore,222
α1,j is the constant for alternative j in game 1, where, for identification reasons, we set α1,2 = 0,223
thus estimating constants for the status quo alternative (alternative 1 above) and the “indifferent”224
alternative (alternative 3 above). We acknowledge that the treatment of the indifference alternative225
using a constant is simplistic in a random utility context, but a more detailed treatment was outside226
the scope of this analysis. For the travel time and salary attributes, the actual values were used,227
rather than the changes as presented in the survey, as this gave better model fit in the context of228
the non-linear specification for salary. When working with changes rather than absolute values, the229
solution would have been to interact the changes with the base level non-linearly6.230
For the second set of choices, as shown in Figure 2, (i.e., the ‘joint’ game), the alternatives are231
now described by the travel time and salary for both partners, and the utilities are given by:232
6 We thank an anonymous referee for this comment.
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Vnt1 = ν [α2,1 + λ (βTTTTnt1 + βL-SalL-Salnt1)
+ (1− λ) (βTTTTpt1 + βL-SalL-Salpt1)]
Vnt2 = ν [λ (βTTTTnt2 + βL-SalL-Salnt2)
+ (1− λ) (βTTTTpt2 + βL-SalL-Salpt2)]
Vnt3 = να2,3
(5)
This incorporates first a multiplication of the utility by ν, which gives the scale parameter for the233
second set of choices, with the scale for game 1 being normalised to 1. As in game 1, we estimate234
constants specific to game 2, namely α2,j , where α2,2 = 0. The marginal utility coefficients are235
identical to those defined for Equation 4, while the associated attributes are now distinct for person236
n and their partner, indexed by p. The additional parameter λ refers to the weight that respondent237
n assigns to the circumstances affecting himself or herself, relative to those affecting their partner.238
Whilst the specification in Equation 5 allows for respondent n to assign different weights to239
his/her own overall circumstances than those of his/her partner, it is conceivable that such differ-240
ences also arise at the level of individual attributes, i.e. allowing for a greater disparity between241
the self and partner valuations for one attribute than for another. For this purpose, Equation 5242
can be adapted to:243
Vnt1 = ν [α2,1 + λTTβTTTTnt1 + (1− λTT)βTTTTpt1
+ λL-SalβL-SalL-Salnt1 + (1− λL-Sal)βL-SalL-Salpt1]
Vnt2 = ν [λTTβTTTTnt2 + (1− λTT)βTTTTpt2
+ λL-SalβL-SalL-Salnt2 + (1− λL-Sal)βL-SalL-Salpt2]
Vnt3 = να2,3 (6)
From Equation 6, it becomes clear that a corresponding specification could have been obtained244
without the λ parameters by instead using separate marginal utility coefficients for respondent n245
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and their partner p, as already alluded to in Section 2. We chose the above specification partly as246
it will facilitate interpretation in the models incorporating random heterogeneity, and avoids the247
need to specify correlation between βn and βp. The λ parameters now have even more importance248
than in Equation 5. Two views arise. They could be interpreted as differences the respondent249
perceives between his/her valuations of the attributes and those of his/her partner. Arguably250
more realistically, they could also be interpreted as the importance rating the respondent places on251
his/her own circumstances compared to those of their partner.252
The specifications in Equations 4, 5 and 6 serve as the basis for the first three of our models.253
In particular:254
Model 1 uses Equation 4 for the game 1 choices and Equation 5 for the game 2 choices, keeping λ255
fixed at 0.5, i.e. assuming that the decision maker gives equal weight to his/her partner.256
Model 2 expands on model 1 by estimating λ.257
Model 3 replaces Equation 5 with Equation 6, thus estimating separate λ parameters for travel258
time and salary.259
3.2.2 Model results260
The estimation results for the first three models are summarised in Table 1, where these models261
do not accommodate any heterogeneity across respondents, either deterministically or randomly.262
Looking at model 1, we see that all else being equal, there is some evidence of a preference for the263
status quo option (estimates for α1,1 and α2,1). The rate for the indifference alternative is below264
five percent, where we once again acknowledge the imperfect treatment of this alternative. The265
impact of increases in travel time is negative while the impact of increases in salary is positive,266
with the log-transform ensuring decreasing marginal returns. This model imposes the assumption267
that a respondent gives equal weight to both members of the household (λ = 0.5), while the268
scale parameter for the second game is not significantly different from the base of 1, suggesting no269
significant differences in the relative weight of the modelled and random utilities in the two games.270
Looking next at model 2, which freely estimates λ, we note only a minor and not statistically271
significant improvement in model fit. This is in line with the estimate for λ changing only from272
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Tab. 1: Results: models 1 - 3
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Equal weights Generic λ Attribute-specific λ
est. t-rat. est. t-rat. est. t-rat.
α1,1 0.5370 9.67 0.5370 9.68 0.5370 9.67
α1,3 4.2100 2.76 4.2000 2.76 4.2100 2.76
α2,1 0.9210 7.03 0.9220 7.03 0.9240 7.04
α2,3 4.4000 2.78 4.3900 2.77 4.4000 2.77
βTT -0.0323 12.34 -0.0323 12.36 -0.0323 12.34
βL-Sal 0.7330 4.91 0.7320 4.90 0.7330 4.91
λ 0.5 - 0.4870 12.98 - -
(0.35)§
λTT - - - - 0.4730 11.89
(0.54)§
λL-Sal - - - - 0.5690 4.48
(0.68)§
ν 0.9240 11.42 0.9240 11.42 0.9230 11.43
(0.94)† (0.94)† (0.95)†
L
(
βˆ
)
-14,136.007 -14,135.945 -14,135.505
ρ¯2 0.358 0.358 0.358
† Note: t-rat. are relative to 1.
§ Note: t-rat. are relative to 0.5.
0.5 to 0.4870, where this change is not significant at the usual confidence levels. The remaining273
estimates remain unaffected.274
A similar observation can be made for model 3, where the gains in fit obtained by allowing for275
attribute specific λ parameters are once again not significant at usual levels, and where neither276
weight parameter is significantly different from the base value of 0.5.277
3.3 Models allowing for heterogeneity278
3.3.1 Model specification279
The three base models from Section 3.2 make the assumption of complete homogeneity across all280
respondents in all households for both the β and λ parameters. This assumption is gradually281
relaxed in the subsequent four models, which accommodate heterogeneity across respondents.282
Model 4 expands on model 3 by accounting for deterministic heterogeneity by estimating separate283
β coefficients and separate λ coefficients for male and female respondents. This allows us to284
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investigate whether there are any distinct differences by gender regarding how the members285
of the household dyad valued an increase in their own salary compared with how they valued286
an increase in their partner’s salary, and in their willingness to accept a longer commute in287
return. This still equates to using Equation 4 and Equation 6, but with two sets of β and λ288
coefficients, relating to male and female respondents. It is important to note that this does289
not equate to using separate coefficients for the respondent and his/her partner in Equation 6.290
In the final three models, we move to a specification accommodating random heterogeneity across291
respondents using Mixed Logit structures (see e.g. Train, 2009). Specifically, we still use separate292
parameters for male and female respondents, but now allow for additional random variation.293
Model 5 expands on model 4 by allowing for additional random heterogeneity in the β parameters,294
using Lognormal distributions in a mixed logit model, where we allow for correlation between295
the travel time and salary coefficients, while still using separate coefficients for male and296
female respondents. In detail, and using the example of a female respondent, this equates to297
having:298
〈ln (βf,L-Sal) , ln (−βf,TT)〉 ∼MVN
(
µβf ,Ωβf
)
, (7)
such that the logarithms of the coefficients (with a sign change for the travel time coefficient)299
follow a multivariate Normal distribution, with mean µβf =
〈
µln(βf,L-Sal), µln(−βf,TT)
〉
, and300
covariance matrix Ωβf =
〈
σ2
ln(βf,L-Sal)
, σ2
ln(−βf,TT), σln(βf,L-Sal),ln(−βf,TT)
〉
, where the first two301
terms relate to variances, and the third term is the covariance. In model estimation, this is302
achieved by using a Cholesky decomposition, which we return to below. A corresponding no-303
tation applies for male respondents. The distribution of random terms was carried out across304
households, where the panel specification ensured constant sensitivities for both individuals305
within a household across their choices (while still allowing for separate sensitivities for each306
of the individuals). For these models, the log-likelihood was simulated using 500 Halton draws307
(Halton, 1960).308
Model 6 is a different generalisation of model 4 in that it allows for random heterogeneity in the λ309
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parameters, using Uniform distributions, with e.g.310
λf,L-Sal ∼ U [λf,µL-Sal − λf,sL-Sal , λf,µL-Sal + λf,sL-Sal ] , (8)
so that λf,L-Sal is uniformly distributed between λf,µL-Sal − λf,sL-Sal and λf,µL-Sal + λf,sL-Sal .311
Model 7 combines models 5 and 6, allowing for heterogeneity in both the β and λ parameters, using312
the same distributional assumptions as in these models, while still using separate parameters313
for male and female respondents.314
3.3.2 Model results315
We now turn our attention to models accommodating differences across respondents, where results316
for models 4 to 7 are summarised in Table 2. Model 4 expands on model 3 by allowing for differences317
between male and female respondents in the β and λ parameters, using subscripts m and f . This318
leads to an improvement in model fit by 4.11 units over model 3, which, at the cost of 4 additional319
parameters, is only significant at the 92% level. A detailed study of the results, using an asymptotic320
t-ratio for differences in parameters, reveals that the main differences arise in the β and λ parameters321
for travel time, although these differences are only significant at the 82% level for λTT and the 90%322
level for βTT. Overall, this model would suggest only small differences between male and female323
respondents when accommodating deterministic heterogeneity alone.324
The next step was to allow for random heterogeneity across respondents in the β parameters,325
where this is accommodated in model 5. As discussed before, we use multivariate Lognormal326
distributions, where µln(βf,L-Sal) and µln(−βf,TT) give the means of the underlying Normal distri-327
butions in the case of female respondents (where a corresponding notation with m applies to328
male respondents). We allow for correlation between the travel time and salary sensitivities and329
thus estimate three parameters for the Cholesky matrix, listed in the table as s terms. Hence,330
|s11,ln(βf,L-Sal)| gives the standard deviation for the underlying Normal distribution for ln (βf,L-Sal),331
i.e. σln(βf,L-Sal) while the corresponding standard deviation for ln (−βf,TT), i.e. σln(−βf,TT) is332
given by
√
s2
21,ln(−βf,TT) + s
2
22,ln(−βf,TT), with the covariance (σln(βf,L-Sal),ln(−βf,TT)) being equal to333
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s11,ln(βf,L-Sal)s21,ln(−βf,TT). No sign constraint is imposed on any of the elements in the Cholesky334
matrix so as to allow for positive as well as negative covariances. The Cholesky parameters are335
obviously arbitrary depending on the order in which the coefficients are specified, whereas the re-336
quired variance and covariance of the “true” parameters are unambiguous. For this reason, Table337
3 also shows the implied distributions for the transformed parameters in the models 5 to 7.338
Looking first at Table 2, we see that model 5 obtains a dramatic improvement in log-likelihood339
over model 4, with a hugely significant increase of 2,993.32 units at the cost of 6 additional pa-340
rameters. This is a result of allowing for random heterogeneity as well as explicitly capturing the341
correlation across choices for the same respondent. The first observation to be made from the342
estimates for model 5 is that the constants for the first and third alternatives are now negative,343
possibly as a result of some of the behaviour previously captured by positive constants for the first344
and third alternative now being captured by the tails of the Lognormal distribution (remembering345
that the values for both the travel time and salary attributes are largest for the second alternative,346
which does not have a constant). We acknowledge that the tails of the lognormal distribution are347
long and entail high variances, but the distribution provided superior fit on this dataset and is348
in line with micro-economic theory when compared to unbounded alternatives. Additionally, the349
impact of the variances is reduced when looking at coefficient ratios in Section 3.4.350
Turning to the λ parameters, we see that λf,µTT and λm,µTT are now significantly different351
from 0.5, while the differences between male and female respondents for λµTT are also statistically352
significant at high levels, with a t-ratio for differences of 3.13. Across all four λ parameters, we see353
an indication of greater weight being assigned to the respondent’s attributes than to those of their354
partner.355
All parameters relating to the lognormally distributed β coefficients are statistically significant.356
Using an asymptotic t-ratio for differences in parameters, we find that the differences between357
male and female respondents for the underlying mean for the salary distribution, µln(βf,L-Sal) and358
µln(βm,L-Sal), are significant with a confidence level of 97%. This observation, in line with a similar359
observation for the λ parameters above, suggests that the recovery of significant differences between360
male and female respondents is facilitated by additionally allowing for random heterogeneity across361
respondents. Finally, we see that the results for model 5 show significantly higher scale for game362
2, i.e. the joint decisions, than for game 1. This was not the case in models 1 to 4, and could363
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Tab. 3: Analysis of random parameters for models 5 - 7
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Random β Random λ Random β and λ
Male Female Male Female Male Female
λL-Sal (lower bound) 0.558 0.533
-2.120 -4.5070 0.454 0.411
λL-Sal (upper bound) 4.860 3.5330 0.798 0.657
λTT (lower bound) 0.540 0.605
-0.454 0.5047 0.419 0.356
λTT (upper bound) 1.268 0.5393 0.669 0.880
µL-Sal 180.37 214.39 0.79 0.78 149.90 125.97
σL-Sal 6,902.64 7,370.03 - - 4,400.27 3,795.42
µTT -0.25 -0.25 -0.03 -0.03 -0.27 -0.24
σTT 0.21 0.19 - - 0.23 0.17
correlation (βL-Sal, βTT) -0.17 -0.18 - - -0.18 -0.20
suggest that a failure to accommodate random variations in sensitivities led to an inability to364
adequately model the choices for game 2 in these earlier models, also reflected in our ability to365
now capture differences in the weights attached to a respondent and their partner. The finding of366
higher scale in more complex but still accessible choice tasks is not new (Caussade et al, 2005).367
A possible further interpretation for the higher scale in game 2 is that when being asked to make368
decisions on workplace location, a decision maker finds it easier to make an informed choice when369
having information on the effects for both household members. This would translate into more370
deterministic choices.371
Looking at the implied heterogeneity patterns in Table 3, we observe very high levels of hetero-372
geneity for the salary coefficients, with much more modest levels for the travel time coefficients7.373
There is negative correlation between the two coefficients, which is in line with expectations, where374
respondents who are more sensitive to salary are less sensitive to travel time, and vice versa. This375
is what drives the heterogeneity in the relative sensitivities between travel time and salary, where376
strong positive correlation would result in very low heterogeneity in the trade-offs. The actual377
implied differences in trade-offs between male and female respondents are studied in detail later.378
Model 6 takes a different approach to model 5 by allowing for heterogeneity in the λ parameters379
7 While µln(βf,L-Sal) in Table 2 relates to the mean of the underlying Normal distribution for the salary coefficient
for female respondents, µL-Sal represents the resulting mean of the Lognormal distribution, with σL-Sal giving the
resulting standard deviation. The means and standard deviations for the Lognormal distribution can be obtained as
simple transforms of the parameters for the underlying Normal distribution reported in Table 2, using the formulae
reported in Train (2009, page 150).
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rather than the β parameters, where Uniform distributions are used, with e.g. λf,L-Sal having a380
mean of λf,µL-Sal , with Uniform variation between λf,µL-Sal − λf,sL-Sal and λf,µL-Sal + λf,sL-Sal . This381
model obtains an improvement in log-likelihood by 124.19 units over model 4, which is statistically382
significant at the cost of 4 additional parameters, but is clearly far more modest than the improve-383
ment obtained by model 5. As in model 5, we again see heightened scale for game 2. However, a384
further inspection of the estimates (see Table 3) shows that with the exception of λf,TT, the range385
of the λ parameters falls outside the [0, 1] boundary, where, for λf,L-Sal, we even obtain a negative386
mean. As noted earlier, a number of interpretations have been put forward for such estimates, but387
we believe that at least in some cases, this is a result of confounding with other heterogeneity, a388
point we investigate further in model 7. Additionally, in the present case, negative λ parameters389
would lead to a change in the sign of the marginal utility coefficients, which is clearly nonsensical. A390
further potential reason for sign violations of the range of weight parameters could be where the true391
distribution is asymmetrical while the analyst attempts to fit a symmetrical distribution. However,392
the results from model 7 seem to rather point in the direction of unaccounted for heterogeneity in393
the marginal utility coefficients.394
Model 7 presents a generalisation of both model 5 and model 6. In comparison with model395
5, we obtain gains in log-likelihood by 19.40 which is statistically significant, at the cost of 4396
additional parameters. Similarly, model 7 obtains a hugely significant improvement in log-likelihood397
by 2,888.52 units over model 6, at the cost of 6 additional parameters. This shows the benefit of398
allowing jointly for heterogeneity in β and λ, although some of the gains over model 5 could be the399
result of the more flexible distributional assumptions for the marginal utility coefficients in game 2400
(Uniform multiplying a Lognormal, instead of a Lognormal alone). We can see from Table 3 that401
jointly accommodating heterogeneity in β and λ leads to reductions in the levels of heterogeneity402
(e.g. the coefficient of variation for salary for male respondents drops from 38.27 to 29.35), albeit403
that the tails of the Lognormal clearly remain quite influential. As was the case in model 5,404
the constants for the first and third alternative are once again negative. The parameters for the405
lognormally distributed β coefficients again all attain high levels of significance, although it needs406
to be recognised that these relate to the parameters of the underlying Normal distribution and407
that the significance levels may be different for the transformed parameters (i.e. on the Lognormal408
scale). Crucially, in contrast with model 6, all λ parameters now have a range that is strictly within409
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the [0, 1] interval (cf. Table 3). This final model is also more successful in retrieving significant410
differences between male and female respondents, in line with similar observations for model 5 -411
for example, we find that the differences between male and female respondents for the underlying412
mean for the salary distribution, µln(βf,L-Sal) and µln(βm,L-Sal), are significant with a confidence level413
of 99%.414
3.4 Implied trade-offs415
As a next step in our comparison between the different models, we now look at relative valuations416
of the two attributes. The context of the survey was a study of the willingness by respondents417
to accept higher travel time in return for higher salary, and as such, the focus in this section is418
specifically on that ratio, as opposed to the willingness to accept lower salary in return for shorter419
travel times, which would be similar in meaning to the widely used value of travel time savings.420
The calculation of the ratios between the two coefficients is complicated by the use of the log-421
transform for salary in all models, meaning that the WTA reduces with increasing income. This422
implies, quite logically, that, as the marginal benefit of increased salary is decreasing, i.e. at higher423
salaries, a respondent becomes less sensitive to salary increases, this yields a lower willingness to424
accept increased travel time in return for salary increases. In a model with fixed coefficients only,425
the trade-off would be given by βL-SalβTT · 1Sal , i.e. the trade-off is divided by the salary and we get a426
lower willingness to accept travel time increases in return for salary reductions for respondents with427
higher salary8. By thinking about the inverse of this ratio, we can see that the relative importance428
of time against money increases as salary increases, which is consistent with the usual finding of a429
value of time increasing with salary.430
Given the above non-linearities, our analysis calculated individual WTA values for each SP431
observation in the data, using the salary for the chosen alternative, and our results look at the432
distribution of the resulting WTA measures in the sample population. The decision to work the433
WTA out at the chosen salary rather than at the status quo or current salary is based on a desire to434
compute the WTA in the stated choice data rather than in the RP market. However, it should be435
8 Looking at model 1, we have that the ratio between the log-salary and time coefficients is equal to 22.69. This
then needs to divided by a respondent’s salary to get the implied WTA. For example, the lowest male salary is
SEK3,750, giving a willingness to accept 0.006 minutes per additional Krona. For a respondent at the highest male
salary, in this case SEK75,000, the WTA is much lower, at 0.0003 minutes per additional Krona.
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Tab. 4: Results: trade-offs
WTA extra mins per trip for 1,000K extra a month
Female respondents
Self Partner
mean s.d. cv mean s.d. cv
Model 1 1.1016 0.81 0.74 0.7927 0.49 0.62
Model 2 1.1001 0.81 0.74 0.7916 0.49 0.62
Model 3 1.3251 0.98 0.74 0.6483 0.40 0.62
Model 4 1.2549 0.93 0.74 0.7640 0.47 0.62
Model 5 12.3723 122.79 9.92 11.9482 150.41 12.59
Model 6 undefined undefined
Model 7 9.5305 105.23 11.04 7.6079 88.15 11.59
Male respondents
Self Partner
mean s.d. cv mean s.d. cv
Model 1 0.7897 0.48 0.61 1.1200 0.86 0.76
Model 2 0.7887 0.48 0.61 1.1184 0.85 0.76
Model 3 0.9500 0.58 0.61 0.9160 0.70 0.76
Model 4 1.0666 0.65 0.61 0.7800 0.60 0.76
Model 5 7.7722 83.28 10.71 10.2491 109.88 10.72
Model 6 undefined undefined
Model 7 8.6593 88.47 10.22 8.4555 95.26 11.27
noted that this had a negligible effect on results. Overall WTA measures would have been higher436
by just 1.3% when using the status quo income (which is on average lower than the chosen income),437
with the standard deviation of the WTA measures increasing by 4.6% overall.438
The calculation becomes somewhat more complicated once we introduce λ parameters as well439
as deterministic and random heterogeneity across respondents. Here, the mean and standard440
deviations are calculated analytically rather than using simulation, which would be unreliable due441
to the long tails of the Lognormal distribution. An important issue arises in model 6. The fact that442
the distribution of the λ parameters falls outside the [0, 1] range means that the moments of the443
resulting WTA distribution are undefined (cf. Daly et al., 2012), and as such are not reported. This444
is a further reason for attempting to ensure constant signs across respondents in the λ parameters,445
a point seemingly not recognised in earlier work.446
A number of key observations can be made from the results in Table 4. Accommodating random447
heterogeneity across respondents in the β parameters obviously leads to a very significant increase448
in heterogeneity in the WTA measures, whereas the heterogeneity in the initial models is merely449
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a result of the non-linear specification (using the logarithm of salary). At the same time, we also450
see a significant increase in the mean WTA measures, leading to more realistic values than was the451
case in the first four models by bringing them closer to common value of time findings.452
Focussing on the results from model 7, which gave the best overall performance, we can see453
that for female respondents, the WTA measures for the respondents themselves are higher than454
those they assign to their male partners. Although female respondents assign more weight to their455
partner’s salary than his travel time, which would imply higher WTA, the actual salary for male456
respondents is higher in this sample, leading to lower WTA measures. Male respondents on the457
other hand assign more weight to their partner’s travel time than to her salary, which would lead458
to low WTA measures, but this is compensated for by the lower salary for female respondents in459
the data, meaning that the final WTA measures assigned by male respondents to themselves and460
their partner are very similar.461
4 Conclusions462
This paper has focussed on the issue of the representation of heterogeneity in choice models that463
are either estimated on data from joint decisions or data on decisions made by a single person but464
affecting multiple individuals. Our empirical example has focussed on the latter.465
A number of central ideas are put forward in the paper, and tested in an empirical study using466
a stated choice dataset in which each partner was asked to evaluate scenarios leading to changes in467
travel time and salary for both themselves and their partner.468
Firstly, we argue that differences in weights assigned to individual partners of a household may469
vary across attributes. Our results show that the weights respondents assign to their partners do470
indeed vary across attributes, although such differences are only properly retrieved when allowing471
for heterogeneity in the marginal utility coefficients9. For example, using an asymptotic t-ratio472
for differences in parameters, we find significant differences between the mean female allocation of473
salary and travel time weights, λf,µTT and λf,µL-Sal respectively, in both model 5 and model 7, with474
a confidence level of 92% applying to the differences in model 7.475
Secondly, we argue that there is scope for significant heterogeneity across respondents in under-476
9 Note that efforts to study differences between λTT and λL-Sal were only moderately successful in models 3 and 4.
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lying sensitivities as well as the relative weights assigned to themselves and their partners. This is477
once again confirmed in the empirical example, showing significant improvements in model fit when478
allowing for random heterogeneity in the β parameters, and to a lesser extent in the λ parame-479
ters. We also retrieve differences between male and female respondents in both sets of parameters,480
but here there is evidence that such differences can only be adequately captured if simultaneously481
accommodating random variations.482
Thirdly, and most importantly, we argue that there is potentially significant scope for con-483
founding between heterogeneity in marginal sensitivities and heterogeneity in bargaining or weight484
parameters. Additionally, there is a risk of inappropriate assumptions for the distribution of ran-485
domly distributed bargaining or weight parameters leading to misguided results and interpretations.486
These claims are strongly supported by the evidence from model 6. This model shows that only487
allowing for heterogeneity in λ without accounting for heterogeneity in β leads to overstated het-488
erogeneity in the former, along with suggesting a significant share of the distribution for λ falling489
outside the conventional [0, 1] range. While arguments have been put forward to justify such values,490
we argue here that an incomplete or inappropriate treatment of heterogeneity in the β parameters491
may exacerbate such problems; a claim entirely supported by the differences in results between492
model 6 and model 7, notwithstanding the slightly different role for λ in our models. It may also493
play a role in results showing a dominant role for one partner, e.g. as in Dosman and Adamowicz494
(2006). Clearly, it is also crucial not to use distributional assumptions that would a priori postulate495
the presence of such values, such as in the use of a normally distributed λ parameter (cf. Beharry-496
Borg et al., 2009); here the same argument applies as for marginal utility coefficients with strong497
a priori sign expectations (cf. Hess et al., 2005). In a specification such as used here, a negative λ498
parameter would also lead to sign violations for the marginal utility coefficients.499
The greater ability of retrieving heterogeneity in the λ parameters when additionally accommo-500
dating random heterogeneity in the marginal utility coefficients is also highlighted in Table 5, which501
again shows the problems arising with model 6 due to its failure to account for such heterogeneity502
in β while allowing for heterogeneity in λ.503
In terms of actual empirical findings for the data at hand, there is evidence of significant504
heterogeneity across respondents in their own trade-offs between salary and travel time, as well505
as the weight they assign for those two attributes for their partner. Most of this heterogeneity is506
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Tab. 5: Results: weight parameters
Travel time
Female Male
Lower
Mean
Upper Lower
Mean
Upper
bound bound bound bound
Model 1 - 0.5 - - 0.5 -
Model 2 - 0.4870 - - 0.4870 -
Model 3 - 0.4730 - - 0.4730 -
Model 4 - 0.5480 - - 0.4080 -
Model 5 - 0.6050 - - 0.5400 -
Model 6 0.4507 0.5220 0.5933 -0.4540 0.4070 1.2680
Model 7 0.3560 0.6180 0.8800 0.4190 0.5440 0.6690
Salary
Female Male
Lower
Mean
Upper Lower
Mean
Upper
bound bound bound bound
Model 1 - 0.5 - - 0.5 -
Model 2 - 0.4870 - - 0.4870 -
Model 3 - 0.5690 - - 0.5690 -
Model 4 - 0.5890 - - 0.5720 -
Model 5 - 0.5330 - - 0.5580 -
Model 6 -4.5070 -0.4870 3.5330 -2.1200 1.3700 4.8600
Model 7 0.4110 0.5340 0.6570 0.4540 0.6260 0.7980
random, but some is also linked to differences between men and women. Here, there is evidence507
that male respondents give more weight to their partner’s travel time than to her salary, with the508
opposite applying to female respondents. These differences do not translate directly into the WTA509
patterns though, given the non-linear valuation of increases in salary and the higher overall salary510
for male respondents.511
There is significant scope for future work. This includes attempts to validate our findings512
on other data, looking into the impact of heterogeneity assumptions in a more traditional joint513
decision making context, as well as studies across a range of topic areas, including leisure and514
non-leisure activities. Future work should also concentrate more on linking heterogeneity in λ to515
underlying respondent characteristics, where the main emphasis thus far has been on income, but516
where scope also exists to study the impact of gender roles, the relative levels of education of each517
of the household members, and their employment status and patterns. In general, greater effort518
should go into explaining heterogeneity in both λ and β in such a deterministic manner, but in519
4 Conclusions 25
the present case, gender was the main discriminator. Similarly, there is scope for testing non-linear520
formulations for the weight parameters in future work, where in the present paper, we restricted521
ourselves to a standard linear specification.522
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